A.1 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
We first analyze the incentive compatibility condition for low types. Notice that the objective for a low-type agent deviating to purchasing a good reputation is formulated in Equation (9). The first-order condition of Equation (9) is αw h -2k l w l ' + βp gb v d = 0, which leads to the deviating effort as w´l = w h k h /k l . The deviating profit and equilibrium profit for low types become 
Similarly, we can establish that wh = w l k l /k h . The corresponding deviating profit and equilibrium profit for high types are ( ) ( )
Incentive compatibility condition for high types requires π h # π h , which is equivalent to ( )
Equation (12) and as in the proposition. For any separating equilibrium that satisfies the above condition, the corresponding proportion λ ratio must be between and ; that is, . Furthermore, in order to find a λ that satisfies the above conditions, λ λ
The first condition is apparently true, and the second condition can be simplified as
In addition, because β 0 [0, 1], a separating equilibrium requires , which can be
rewritten as with as in Equation (10).
Substituting f θ in Equation (7) and v d in Equation (8) into Equations (5) and (6), we can derive w θ as in Equations (13) and (14).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Notice that is decreasing in α. We can verify that the second fraction in (i.e., ) is 2 2 1 2 2 2 
A.3 Proof of Corollaries 1, 2, and 3
Notice that Equations (13) and (14) can be reorganized as and 
and w l increases in p gb / p bg ; otherwise, the denominator increases and w l decreases in p gb / p bg .
Proof of Corollary 3: Note that
It follows directly from the expressions of v d , w l , and w h that they are all decreasing in λ l / λ h and λ l .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: , , , , and
The first three equations lead to
where .
High types at good and bad reputations must be indifferent; that is, π h = π hb , which leads to 
The equilibrium levels of v d and m can be solved through (28) and (32).
For low types, denote their deviating effort and profit as w l ' and π l '. If they deviate to a good reputation, their incentive can be described through the first-order condition as αw h -2k t w l ' + βp gb v d = 0, which leads to w l ' = w h k h /k l . For low types to prefer bad reputations to good reputations, we need , or equivalently
Note that w l ' = w h k h / k l and w l = w hb k h / k l , and k h / k l < 1. The above IC condition holds as long as w l ' > w l , which can be simplified to the condition on p gb / p bg in Proposition 4.
We also need to ensure that m 0 [0. 1] in equilibrium. First, notice that both M and βv d are decreasing in m. We then rearrange Equation (28) as
Note that the left-hand side (LHS) of this equation is increasing in m while the right-hand side (RHS) of the equation is decreasing in m.
In order for m to be between 0 and 1, it suffices to show that (1) when m = 0, LHS < RHS in Equation (28) 
where β 2 is defined as in Equation (18). Similarly, when m = 1, we have M = 1/2k l , LHS = , and RHS = . The condition LHS > RHS is equivalent to
, or β > β 1 , where β 1 is defined as in Equation (17). It is easy
In addition, we also need to ensure β 1 < 1, which leads to condition λ l / λ h < λ 1 where λ 1 is defined as in Equation (19).
A.5 Proof to Proposition 5
The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: , , ,
The first three equations lead to where ( )
Low types at good and bad reputations must be indifferent; that is, π l = π lg , which leads to
We can solve for v d by substituting in Equations (34) to (36) 
The equilibrium level of v d and n are determined by (33) and (37).
For high types, denote their deviating effort and profit as w h ' and π h '. If they deviate to a bad reputation, their incentive can be described through the first-order condition as αw l -2k h w h ' + βp bg v d = 0, which leads to w h ' 2 = k l w l / k h . For high types to prefer good reputations to bad reputations, we need π h ' < π h , or equivalently We also need to ensure that in equilibrium n 0 [0, 1]. First, notice that both N and βv d are decreasing in n, which can be verified with simple algebra. We then rearrange Equation (33) as
Notice that the left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in n while the right-hand side is increasing in n. For the equilibrium n to be between 0 and 1, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) when n = 0, Equation (38) becomes an inequality with the left-hand side (LHS) greater than the right-hand side (RHS); and (2) when n = 1, Equation (38) The corresponding condition in terms of β becomes β 3 < β < β 4 , where β 3 and β 4 are defined as in Equations (20) and (21). We can verify that β 3 < β 4 . In addition, we also need to ensure β 3 < 1 and β 4 > 0, for which it suffices to show that 1 / β 3 > 1, or equivalently, λ l / λ h > λ 2 where λ 2 is defined as in Equation (22).
